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Abstract: 
 
This paper explores how humanitarianism operates within the nation-state, asking: what 
strategies do lawyers employ to help undocumented immigrants access membership rights in the 
United States though humanitarian policies? I identify three concurrent evaluations that lawyers 
undertake to determine legalization strategies. First, attorneys carry out an assessment of threat 
of deportation because not all undocumented immigrants are equally at risk. Second, they 
determine eligibility by matching migrants’ complex lived experiences to narrow, formal 
eligibility criteria, which often exclude individuals arbitrarily. Third, attorneys determine 
whether each case is “strong” or “weak” (more/less likely to acquire status) by identifying 
instances of migrant suffering to transform them into what I call “humanitarian capital,” a 
symbolic resource legible to adjudicators in the immigration bureaucracy who grant legal status 
on the basis of compassion to limited numbers of exceptional cases. 
Keywords: humanitarianism, citizenship, asylum.  
 
In the context of an increasingly punitive immigration system, obtaining legal status has 
	 2 
become a challenge for the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the US (Massey 
et. al. 2014). However, certain humanitarian policies provide exceptions to this restrictive trend 
for particular categories of immigrants deemed too vulnerable to be morally excluded outright. 
Based on data collected during 28 months of ethnographic fieldwork at a legal aid organization, 
this paper examines how lawyers help immigrants apply for these policies, which provide legal 
status and a path to citizenship on humanitarian grounds:  
• Asylum;  
• U-Visa for victims of crime;  
• Cancellation of Removal for immigrants with a family member who would suffer 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” were the immigrant deported; 
• Special Immigrant Juvenile Status for abandoned, abused, or neglected children.  
When I started fieldwork in January 2015 at the Center for Legal Aid (CLA)1 in Los 
Angeles, the clientele was primarily comprised of undocumented immigrants from Mexico, El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Some had recently arrived in the US, as escalating levels of 
violence and criminal victimization prompted outmigration from the Central American Northern 
Triangle (Hiskey et. al. 2018) and Mexico (Massey et. al. 2014). Among them were children 
migrating alone and seeking humanitarian relief in unprecedented numbers. Others were long-
term US residents who remained undocumented. CLA’s client composition reflected broader 
patterns and histories of immigration and hindered access to citizenship for these groups. 
Guatemalans and Salvadorans have struggled to gain political recognition as refugees since the 
exodus from the civil wars of the 1980s (Coutin 2000), causing many to remain undocumented 
or in prolonged states of “liminal legality” (Menjívar 2011) (e.g. Temporary Protected Status for 
                                                
1 CLA and all personal names are pseudonyms  
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Salvadorans and Hondurans). Increased border enforcement produced a “caging effect” that 
transformed previously circular Mexican migration flows into permanent (undocumented) 
settlement (Massey et. al. 2014). Today, Mexicans, Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Guatemalans 
are disproportionately targeted by immigration enforcement, accounting for just 66% of the 
undocumented population but 94% of deportations (Menjívar et. al. 2016). Reflecting the 
broader restrictive context for these groups, CLA clients were almost never eligible for family or 
work-based statuses. They could only secure legal status through humanitarian policies if they 
had been victimized before, during or after migration. The composition of CLA’s clientele thus 
provided an ideal case to explore how humanitarianism operates within the nation-state, 
addressing the research question: what strategies do lawyers employ to help undocumented 
immigrants access membership rights though humanitarian policies?  
Situating the analysis in what I conceptualize as the humanitarian field, I identify three 
concurrent evaluations that lawyers undertake to determine humanitarian legalization strategies 
for their immigrant clients. First, attorneys carry out an assessment of threat of deportation 
because not all undocumented immigrants are equally at risk. Second, attorneys determine each 
immigrant’s eligibility for relief by matching complex lived experiences to formal eligibility 
criteria; however, these narrow criteria often exclude individuals in arbitrary ways. Third, 
attorneys determine whether each case is “strong” (more likely to acquire legal status) or “weak” 
(less likely) by identifying, assessing, and consolidating specific instances of suffering in 
immigrants’ lived experiences to transform them into what I call “humanitarian capital,” a 
symbolic resource legible to adjudicators in the immigration bureaucracy who grant legal status 
on the basis of compassion to limited numbers of exceptional cases. My findings highlight the 
contradictory and dehumanizing process in which suffering becomes a means to claim 
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membership in the nation-state. 
 
Theorizing Access to Membership and the Humanitarian Field  
This paper examines how humanitarianism operates within the realm of the nation-state, 
where the particularistic rights and entitlements of citizens (Brubaker 1992), by definition based 
on population distinctions and exclusionary of foreigners, are directly at odds with the 
universalistic and ostensibly apolitical character of humanitarianism (Wilson and Brown 2011).  
National membership boundaries produce a “stratified system of belonging” (Menjivar 
2006), distinguishing between citizens, non-citizens, and a spectrum of in-between statuses, each 
granting different levels of protection for varying amounts of time. Immigrants who find 
themselves inside territorial borders but outside national membership boundaries are categorized 
by the state as “illegal.” While their “deportability” makes them vulnerable and serves as a 
disciplining force (De Genova 2002), physical presence may enable them to acquire legal status. 
Yet not all undocumented immigrants have equally strong normative grounds to claim 
belonging and rights. State policies and discourses construct a “moral economy of illegality” 
(Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012:248) that shapes the structure of opportunities for 
undocumented immigrants’ potential acquisition of membership rights, allowing some to 
become “less illegal” vis-à-vis the state. Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas (2014) distinguish 
between legalization policies that reward “civic performance deservingness frames,” granting 
status to immigrants who demonstrate economic or social integration, and those that are the 
subject of this analysis that reward “vulnerability deservingness frames,” granting status to 
migrants victimized before, during or after migration.  
The latter policies reflect what Wilson and Brown (2011) call the humanitarian “ethos,” a 
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sentiment embedded in civil society and formalized in law and institutions that taps into the 
emotional nature of compassion based on the notion that suffering is a universal human 
experience. “Humanitarian admissions to the polity confirm and reify the identity of the nation as 
good, prosperous and generous” (Dauvergne 2005:4), validating the idea that liberal democracies 
espouse the rule of law and universal human rights as the cornerstone of their political ideologies 
(Joppke 1997). The humanitarian “ethos” to some extent constrains state interests (i.e. excluding 
foreigners), providing opportunities for immigrants to seek inclusion on the basis of compassion.  
However, humanitarian immigration policies remain fundamentally conservative because 
they favor the plight of select subgroups while ignoring the fact that all undocumented 
immigrants are vulnerable precisely due to their lack of legal status (Ticktin 2011). Further, 
when migratory inflows rise, exacerbating the asymmetry between the receiving state’s 
willingness to grant entry (and legal status) and migrant demand, political actors play an active 
role in constructing immigration as a “crisis” that poses a threat to basic societal values and 
interests (Lindley 2014) and narrowly redefine the “liberal humanitarian consensus” (Dauvergne 
2005:4) to justify reducing humanitarian admissions and legalization without compromising the 
positive national identities that humanitarianism conveys. In western liberal democracies, 
temporary “B-statuses” are more frequently being granted than paths to citizenship (Zolberg et. 
al. 1989), and asylum is no longer considered a fundamental human right, enshrined in 
international law, but a measure of exception, compassionately bestowed on few through 
adjudication bureaucracies that implement “discretionary humanitarianism” (Fassin 2011).  
These scholarly critiques of the restrictiveness of the humanitarian immigration system based 
on the rationale of compassion are an accurate characterization of the US asylum process, where 
grant rates remain low (see table 1), particularly for Central Americans and Mexicans who apply 
	 6 
for asylum based on persecution from private actors (gangs and domestic violence). These 
experiences fail to satisfy the “state-centric” refugee definition formalized in international law 
after World War II when refugees were understood to be produced by “regimes […] that preyed 
on certain sections of their citizenry” (Gibney 2004). US policies protecting migrant children 
have also been criticized for straying from the universal children’s rights approach enshrined in 
the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which the US never ratified, to instead adopt a 
victimizing, needs-based approach catering only to sub-groups of minors deemed exceptionally 
vulnerable (Byrne 2018).  
Because legal status is granted as a matter of exception in all petitions for humanitarian relief 
analyzed in this paper, immigrants must demonstrate that they meet the threshold of suffering 
necessary to merit membership rights and exemption from exclusionary immigration control. To 
illustrate how something as intangible as human suffering can be used to obtain tangible rights in 
these petitions, I draw on the concept of “symbolic capital,” defined as those resources that exist 
because they are “perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception, which cause 
them to know [them], recognize [them], and give [them] value” (Bourdieu 1998, 47). I 
conceptualize “humanitarian capital” as a form of symbolic capital that is activated relationally 
as legal intermediaries (immigration lawyers, paralegals) recognize specific instances of 
immigrant suffering and give them value by drawing on their professional knowledge to mine 
formal legal definitions and anticipating the subjective element characteristic of humanitarian 
adjudication, to prepare claims in ways that make suffering legible to adjudicators in the 
immigration bureaucracy. I argue that the level of “humanitarian capital” an undocumented 
immigrant is determined to have alters her position in the “moral economy of illegality” 
(Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012), appealing to the humanitarian “ethos” and affecting her 
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odds of transitioning to a more favorable position in the membership hierarchy of the receiving 
state (e.g. humanitarian visa holder, permanent resident), when adjudicators evaluate whether 
these symbolic resources are sufficient to merit access to concrete rights and legal status.   
Humanitarian policies exist based on the assumption that suffering is measurable and that 
deserving vulnerable immigrants will be adequately identified through a bureaucratic selection 
process. Yet the humanitarian field is characterized by subjectivity, suspicion, and risk. Research 
has shown that lack of regulation and excessive reliance on discretion “widen the margins of 
subjectivity and irrationality” in humanitarian adjudication (Noll 2005:3) so that ideological 
inclinations, personal preferences for particular cases (Ramji-Nogales et. al. 2007), and emotions 
(Ticktin 2011) influence case outcomes. At the same time, institutionalized suspicion of 
claimants “privileges biomedical objectivity and standardized bureaucratic criteria, over 
narrative, self-reported evidence” (Lakhani & Timmermans 2014:373). The indeterminacy 
inherent in the humanitarian field makes immigrants more dependent on legal intermediaries to 
access relief, while also somewhat limiting lawyers’ capacity to anticipate case outcomes. As the 
state prioritizes punitive immigration enforcement over the humanitarian “ethos,” risk becomes a 
more salient feature of the humanitarian field, and I will show how lawyers manage risk by 
strategically positioning themselves as either “agents of the law” (reinforcing legal categories) or 
“critics of the law” (challenging legal categories) (Coutin 2000). 
 
Policy overview 
Humanitarianism is encoded in concrete policies of US immigration law; I next review the 
eligibility criteria, bureaucracies involved in adjudication, and associated rights for each policy.  
Asylum. Incorporated into domestic law with the 1980 Refugee Act, asylum protects 
	 8 
individuals unable or unwilling to return to or avail themselves of the protection of their home 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. There are two routes to 
apply for asylum in the US. Immigrants who have never been apprehended file affirmative 
applications at the asylum office, an independent branch of US Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) that evaluates petitions during non-adversarial interviews. Immigrants denied 
at the asylum office and those apprehended and placed in removal proceedings file defensive 
applications, adjudicated during adversarial hearings in immigration court, with a government 
attorney arguing for the immigrant’s deportation. Asylum-seekers with pending cases may be 
granted a work permit after six months. Migrants granted asylum are eligible to apply for Legal 
Permanent Residency (LPR) after one year and citizenship after four.2  
Asylum under TVPRA. Minors must satisfy the same substantive requirements as adults to be 
awarded asylum. However, the 2008 Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPRA) established 
additional procedural protections for individuals classified as “Unaccompanied Alien Children” 
(i.e. those under age 18, for whom no parents/legal guardians are available to provide care and 
physical custody (6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2))), who are allowed to apply through the non-adversarial 
process at the asylum office even if they have been apprehended. They have higher odds of 
winning their cases through this process (Galli 2018). The 28 May 2013 USCIS memorandum 
established that, once a minor has been classified as a UAC, which usually occurs upon 
apprehension, she must be guaranteed access to the asylum office even if she is later reunified 
with parents, which happens in 60% of cases (ORR 2014), or reaches majority of age.   
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS). The 1990 Immigration Act established SIJS to 
grant status to immigrant children under age 21 who have been abandoned, abused or neglected 
                                                
2 Other LPRs can become citizens after 5 years.  
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by both parents. TVPRA expanded SIJS eligibility to include individuals who were abandoned 
etc. by only one parent. The application involves different bureaucracies. First, children appeal to 
State-level courts to obtain the “SIJS order,” which determines that it is not in their best interest 
to be returned to the home country. In California, this must be obtained before age 18 or age 21 
for individuals abandoned etc. by one or both parents respectively. Other States delimit SIJS 
eligibility differently, depending on State laws. Second, youths apply to adjust their status to 
LPR at USCIS but, due to statutory limitations, applicants from high demand countries (El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico) wait in limbo for over 2 years.  
U-Visa. Created in 2000 with the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, it 
grants temporary status and a work permit for 4-years to immigrants victimized by crime in the 
US who suffered mental or physical abuse as a result and who help law enforcement in the 
investigation of the crime. USCIS bureaucrats review U-Visa applications on paper without 
interviewing applicants.  Grantees can later adjust to LPR but may wait for long periods of time.  
Cancellation of removal. Unlike the above measures, this is a form of prosecutorial 
discretion that immigration judges may grant to non-LPR immigrants who find themselves in 
removal proceedings in immigration court and who can demonstrate: 1) that deportation would 
cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to the applicant’s US citizen or LPR spouse, 
parents, and/or children; 2) 10 years of continuous residence; 3) no criminal record; 4) good 
moral character. If awarded Cancellation, immigrants transition directly to LPR. 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Data and Methods3  
                                                
3 This study obtained IRB approval.  
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This paper is based on 28 months of ethnographic fieldwork at CLA, an organization in Los 
Angeles that provides legal services to immigrants from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and 
Mexico, relying on donations and small fees charged to clients. Los Angeles is well-served by 
legal service-providers compared to places with less dense immigrant populations, which is 
important because legal representation drastically improves the odds of securing humanitarian 
relief (Miller et. al. 2015), and characterized by generally positive local attitudes toward 
immigration, which likely attenuated immigrants’ fear of interacting with the state. Taking into 
account the relatively favorable environment where fieldwork was conducted, the difficulties 
involved in humanitarian legalization I will discuss are notable, leading to the hypothesis that 
these trends would be further exacerbated in less immigrant-friendly places.  
I gained access to the organization access by offering to volunteer, in addition to doing 
research, which allowed me to build rapport with staff based on reciprocity. Most attorneys and 
paralegals were co-ethnics of their clients and first or second-generation immigrants themselves. 
Some had legalized through asylum. These shared experiences and their linguistic and socio-
cultural competencies facilitated their work, giving them a better understanding of their clients’ 
needs. I helped them prepare applications for humanitarian relief by translating testimonies, 
compiling documentary evidence, and interviewing applicants. I shadowed attorneys and 
paralegals when they met with clients (immigrants who had either been released from detention 
or had never been detained) to determine eligibility, prepare applications, and discuss case 
outcomes. I observed these naturally occurring interviews, in Spanish, between legal 
intermediaries and their immigrant clients. I took hand-written notes of these interactions in the 
field, which I later transcribed and expanded on. 
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Determining legalization strategies in the humanitarian field 
As CLA lawyers met with each immigrant client to determine a strategy for legalization, 
they carried out three concurrent moves that I distinguish for analytical purposes and will address 
in turn: (1) managing risk by determining the immigrant’s degree of “deportability” (De Genova 
2002); (2) determining eligibility by matching complex lived experiences to formal eligibility 
criteria; (3) anticipating the chances of success through an assessment of “humanitarian capital”. 
Managing Risk by Determining Degrees of “deportability”  
The legalization strategies lawyers advised were shaped by their assessments of immigrants’ 
degree of “deportability” (De Genova 2002), in other words, the likelihood they would 
effectively be deported or receive a formal deportation order. This was shaped by how visible 
immigrants were to the state’s punitive immigration system and how they came into contact with 
the legal process. Undocumented immigrants who had never been apprehended were “less 
illegal” (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012) because invisible to the state, while those who 
had been apprehended were “more illegal” because they were in removal proceedings in 
immigration court. 
While immigrants who have never been apprehended are also clearly at risk of deportation, 
applying for certain types of humanitarian relief involved the additional risk of declaring their 
presence to the state. The immigrants who fell into this category had usually lived in the US for 
numerous years, and CLA attorneys helped them decide whether to continue living in the 
shadows or to attempt to proactively adjust their status. Due to the different administrative 
procedures in place at the separate adjudication bureaucracies, not all applications for relief were 
equally risky. The greater the risk involved in the application, the more careful CLA lawyers 
were to counsel only those with the “strongest” cases to apply, telling others, “you’ve waited so 
	 12 
long, perhaps it’s better you wait a little longer.” For SIJS and the U-Visa, if USCIS denies a 
case, it should not heighten risk of deportation because immigrants are not placed in removal 
proceedings. Conversely, immigrants who apply for affirmative asylum risk deportation because 
they are placed in removal proceedings if their cases are denied. Finally, Cancellation of 
Removal can only be requested if the immigrant is in removal proceedings, making this the 
riskiest legalization strategy for undocumented immigrants living in the shadows, who had to file 
asylum applications with the goal of being denied and referred to court, where the judge could 
consider granting this relief. 
On the other hand, immigrants who had been apprehended and placed in removal 
proceedings did not proactively seek to adjust status; rather, they were “pushed” into the legal 
process. They had no option but to attempt applying for relief to avoid imminent deportation. In 
these cases, attorneys worked as critics of the law, attempting to stretch legal categories to match 
lived experiences to help clients who feared for their lives in their home countries remain in the 
United States. Most CLA clients fell in this category; they were adults, unaccompanied, and 
accompanied children who had recently arrived from Mexico and Central America, had been 
apprehended at the border, and then released from detention to await the outcomes of their cases 
in immigration court. Attorneys notified clients of the possibilities of success but also 
pragmatically encouraged them to apply for any and all forms of relief they might be eligible for, 
whether or not their cases were “weak” (i.e. less likely to secure relief): 
 
The attorney and I meet with Pablo, a young Salvadoran man who was apprehended at the border, then 
released on bail. He fled after receiving death threats from the gang members who murdered his cousin, 
who had been recently deported from the US. Since he couldn’t afford an attorney, he never showed up to 
court and received a deportation order in absentia. The attorney advises he file a motion to reopen his case 
	 13 
and apply for asylum but cautions, “only about 10% of cases like this get approved, you need witnesses, 
proof, and a very good deposition to improve your chances. You should get your cousin’s autopsy report. 
Make sure you don’t have problems with the law and, in the future, if there is a change in laws, then maybe 
you could fix your papers.” 
 
Having received a deportation order in absentia, Pablo could perhaps be characterized as the 
“most illegal”. Although his case is “weak” due to case law on gang-based claims (the attorney 
calculates a 10% likelihood of winning), he is advised to try reopening it to apply for asylum. 
The alternative would be living in the US with a removal order, risking immediate deportation to 
El Salvador if newly apprehended, a fate that resulted in his cousin’s death. To help a client 
fearful for his life and in the least favorable position vis-à-vis the state’s enforcement branch, the 
attorney counsels applying for asylum despite slim odds of winning the case, so that Pablo might 
live safely in the US, at least while his application is pending, hoping for a positive resolution, 
either through asylum or in case of legislative changes.  
 
Matching complex lived experiences to formal legal categories  
When it came to determining eligibility for relief, immigrants’ lived experiences frequently 
failed to satisfy formal legal categories. To begin, due to existing case law, establishing asylum 
eligibility is complex for Mexican and Central American immigrants who commonly escape the 
persecution of non-state actors, applying for asylum due to gang or domestic violence.4 Their 
asylum applications pose many challenges, as one paralegal noted: 
 
                                                
4 In summer 2018, Attorney General Sessions further complicated matters by barring gang and domestic violence as 
valid grounds for asylum. This decision (Matter of A-B-) is being challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies.  
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The paralegal is worried about how to anticipate a question asylum-seekers get from adjudicators: why 
didn’t you hide in your home country? She asks an attorney for advice, “I’m not sure how to deal with fear 
of return in the applications, because you know, with Salvadorans, it’s not as clear as, like, for Syrians who 
are escaping a war. When I ask them if they tried to relocate in their countries, some people are unclear 
about it or they simply didn’t try.”  
 
The attorney counseled the paralegal to argue that no place in the home country is safe 
because gangs rely on intricate networks to locate people, noting, “the most important thing is to 
create the link with government corruption.” The attorney thus argues that asylum-seekers 
fleeing persecution of non-state actors nonetheless satisfy the “state-centric” refugee definition 
(Gibney 2004) since they are forced to flee because sending state institutions (e.g. the corrupt 
police) that either do not have the capacity to protect its citizens or may even be colluding with 
the private persecutors that victimize them (for more on how laywers construct asylum narratives 
for Central Americans, see Galli 2018). In preparing these types of asylum cases, legal 
intermediaries continue a decades-long legal struggle for the recognition of migrants from this 
region as refugees, serving the role of critics of the law as they attempt to broaden interpretations 
of the refugee definition by filing cases in immigration court, hoping to create expansive 
precedents in evolving case law.  
When matching lived experiences to legal categories to determine asylum eligibility for 
unaccompanied children, the age variable adds another layer of complexity. When a CLA 
attorney asked an undocumented mother why her children, Julio (17-years-old) and Alba (14), 
migrated unaccompanied from Guatemala, she replied, “because they were alone and Julio had 
problems in school with the gangs.” Gang members had targeted Julio, trying to forcibly recruit 
him. Alba, on the other hand, had not yet experienced forcible gang recruitment, likely due to her 
	 15 
younger age. Nonetheless, Alba left with Julio because, as her mother explained, “they are 
siblings; he didn’t want to leave her alone,” particularly since their grandmother, who cared for 
them since their mother migrated to the US several years before, had recently died. Family 
reunification considerations often affect decisions to bring children to the US to subtract them 
from immediate (and often grave) danger. However, family reunification is not a valid basis for 
asylum, despite the fact that the lack of adult caretakers exacerbates children’s vulnerability to 
gang victimization.  
Eligibility for humanitarian relief for immigrant children is also based on age cut-offs. This 
oftentimes results in arbitrary legal outcomes, as age differences involving months or even days 
lead young people living through almost identical situations to fall in or out of eligibility. For 
example, Carlos fled forcible gang recruitment in El Salvador, taking 4 months to reach the US 
because he was apprehended and deported twice in Mexico, where immigration enforcement has 
been increased at the expense of the US government (Rosenblum & Ball 2016). By the time 
Carlos arrived at the US-Mexico border, where he was apprehended, he had just turned 18. This 
made him ineligible for the procedural protections that allow unaccompanied minors to apply at 
the asylum office. He was instead considered an adult and had to apply though the defensive 
process in immigration court, where grant rates are lower, and CLA attorneys determined his 
case would likely be denied. While Carlos risked deportation back to the country he fled because 
his life was in danger, his two brothers (also CLA clients) won their cases after fleeing similar 
experiences of forcible gang recruitment. The main difference was that they were apprehended as 
minors, which allowed them to apply at the asylum office. Fundamentally, the understanding of 
the age when someone is vulnerable in US asylum law (i.e. under 18) does not adequately protect 
youths fleeing Central America. While gangs recruit minors because they are subject to lesser 
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law enforcement penalties, persecution does not end abruptly when youths turn 18. Moreover, 
Carlos was indeed persecuted as a minor, yet he reached the US just after his 18th birthday, 
which is of no relevance to his legal claim, yet left him unprotected.  
Further reflecting the arbitrary nature of age-based eligibility criteria, US policies protecting 
immigrant children define childhood in different ways: under 18 for asylum under TVPRA and 
under 21 or 18 for SIJS, if neglected, abandoned or abused by both parents or by one parent 
respectively. These divergent definitions and complex bureaucratic procedures make the 
legalization process exceptionally difficult to navigate without an attorney. Further, with SIJS, 
immigrants can “age-out” of eligibility due to bureaucratic backlogs if they fail to obtain the 
“SIJS order” in State court before deadlines. Thus, arbitrary factors like court scheduling 
supersede youths’ vulnerability when determining access to relief, as one attorney described:  
 
“with SIJS, it’s very difficult because the clock is ticking, for one of my cases, the minor was turning 
18 on September 20th and we were asking the judge to make an issue on September 15th.”  
 
The urgency relative to the first stage of the application is particularly striking considering 
that, after the “SIJS order” is granted, it takes over 2 years for USCIS to process the second part 
and grant LPR.5 During this time, applicants remain in legal limbo and can be excluded from 
protection if they commit any “adult crimes,” as one attorney explained:  
 
“Don’t do anything illegal, don’t break state or immigration laws. Be on your best behavior. If you 
don’t have a work permit, don’t work. […] I provide a list of things they shouldn’t do and make sure 
they tape it somewhere they can see it and remind themselves they can’t make that one mistake we all 
                                                
5 This has been the case since 2016, when El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico hit statutory limits due to 
high demand. 
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could make at some point […] Depending on the conviction, that could have substantial impact, for 
example possession of a narcotic, I know marijuana was legalized but it’s not for federal purposes.”  
 
The list of forbidden behaviors is a material expression of the “probationary logic” of 
legalization (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). With their lives under heightened scrutiny, 
immigrants cannot afford to make mistakes. Certain behaviors, while inconsequential for US 
citizens (e.g. marijuana consumption is now legal in California), invalidate the possibility of 
converting children’s suffering into “humanitarian capital.” Having defied western assumptions 
of childhood as a time of innocence, immigrant children who commit “adult crimes” cease to be 
considered worthy of humanitarian protection and are instead positioned as deviant adults to be 
targeted by immigration enforcement. 
 
Assessing “humanitarian capital” to determine if cases “strong” or “weak”  
In advising different legalization strategies to their clients, CLA lawyers applied two 
mechanisms, which I call ranking and quantifying suffering, to determine whether cases were 
“strong” (more likely to be awarded status) or “weak” (less likely), assessing how much 
immigrants had suffered and to what extent this suffering could be demonstrated, performed, and 
translated into “humanitarian capital,” a symbolic resource legible to adjudicators who grant 
legal status.  
Ranking suffering consists in comparing clients’ stories to past successful cases to anticipate 
whether the adjudicator is likely to determine the case had sufficient “humanitarian capital” to 
merit relief. In this way, attorneys relied on their experience to mitigate the indeterminacy that 
characterizes the humanitarian legalization process and manage the risk associated with certain 
legalization strategies, such as Cancellation of Removal. The “strong” case of Ana and Diego 
	 18 
from Guatemala and the “weak” case of Beatriz and Guillermo from El Salvador aptly illustrate 
this mechanism. Both couples were invisible to the state, having lived in the US while avoiding 
apprehension for over 10 years. Potentially eligible because they had US-citizen sons with severe 
medical conditions, both couples had learned about Cancellation of Removal through their 
personal networks and wanted to proactively adjust status. To evaluate the strength of each case, 
the lawyers ranked the suffering of their US citizen sons: 
 
Ana and Diego’s son has Down syndrome and a life-threatening heart condition, for which he recently 
had surgery; he is also receiving cognitive and physical treatment for his special needs. Ana has all his 
medical records. “Good,” the attorney says, “this evidence makes for a strong case,” but cautions that 
they will also have to convince the judge that their son is dependent on them. Ana explains, “my baby 
needs me;” she has no family in the US, except her husband, who works while she stays at home with 
their 7 children. Having warned them of the dangers involved, the attorney shows cautious optimism, 
noting the case is potentially strong enough to apply. 
 
Beatriz and Guillermo’s son is autistic, he doesn’t communicate with other people, and relies on them 
for all his basic needs (e.g. getting dressed, using the bathroom). Beatriz says he is enrolled in special 
education in school but is receiving no additional therapy. The attorney says, “this is not good for the 
case.” Hearing this, Guillermo takes some documents out of a folder and hands them to the lawyer; 
they are reports from his special education teacher. The lawyer still doesn’t think that their case is 
strong enough, and, to provide an example of a case that is, explains, “we applied for a woman whose 
child had terminal cancer.” 
  
Both boys depend entirely on their parents and, would suffer immensely if they were 
deported. However, the attorney found only Ana and Diego’s case “strong” enough to satisfy the 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” criteria, having shown the appropriate amount of 
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suffering: their son has a genetic condition and had surgery for a life-threatening heart condition. 
Anticipating the judge will be favorable to their case, the attorney determines this justifies the 
risk of coming of the shadows necessary for this legalization strategy. 
On the other hand, Beatriz and Guillermo have a “weak” case due to one crucial difference: 
their son does not have a life-threatening condition. The attorney determines this through the 
ranking mechanism, comparing their situation to the woman whose child had terminal cancer. 
Thus, a deadly disease (terminal cancer) and a potentially deadly disease (heart condition) 
combined with Down syndrome, are determined to yield the necessary amount of “humanitarian 
capital,” likely to result in a positive case outcome. On the other hand, the suffering constituted 
by autism ranks lower and fails to satisfy the necessary threshold. Having assessed low chances 
of success, the lawyer determines Beatriz and Guillermo’s case is not worth putting through the 
process because it is likely to fail, potentially exposing them to state scrutiny and a higher risk of 
deportation. In these cases, attorneys work as agents of the law, applying legal definitions 
conservatively to protect undocumented immigrants from immigration enforcement. In doing so, 
however, they inadvertently reinforce a dehumanizing legal process that deems only the most 
extreme suffering as deserving of protection. 
Eligibility for Cancellation of Removal also depends on applicants’ “good moral character,” 
reflecting civic performance deservingness frames. Not having satisfied the vulnerability 
deservingness frames of primary importance in humanitarian reliefs, the lawyer does not invest 
time in verifying Beatriz and Guillermo’s civic performance based merits, as these would not 
significantly sway the evaluation of the strength of their case. Conversely, this evaluation was 
relevant in determining the strength of Ana and Diego’s case: 
 
The lawyer explains they must prove they are people of “good moral character,” advising, “it helps to 
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have evidence, like letters from family, church officials, any kind of proof you are involved in the 
community.” Ana and Diego Both tell us they are both church leaders. Because Ana volunteers at school 
and community events, she knows the Mayor of her town, and he has agreed to vouch for her.  
 
Ana and Diego provide the lawyer with numerous details about their involvement in the 
community, demonstrating high levels of “civic capital” (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). 
While “humanitarian capital” yields greater rewards than “civic capital” in the humanitarian 
field, this “strong” case demonstrates how immigrants and attorneys can concurrently mobilize 
different forms of capital and deservingness frames to access relief.  
The second mechanism through which legal intermediaries assess “humanitarian capital” is 
quantifying suffering, which entails identifying and attributing value to certain instances of 
suffering in immigrants’ lives. They thus turn the incommensurable into the measurable to cater 
to the demands of the state. Below is an excerpt from an interview between a paralegal and 
Mexican youth called Francisco who was applying for asylum after having escaped, alongside 
his mother and younger siblings, because a gang was trying to forcibly recruit him. Having been 
apprehended at the border, the family was later released from detention to apply for asylum. 
 
The paralegal types what Francisco said, reading aloud, “‘I locked myself in the house, and I stopped 
going to school. I didn’t go outside for anything.’ What else did you feel?” 
Francisco: “Dread.”  
Paralegal: “Did you eat?” 
Francisco: “Hardly at all.” 
Paralegal: “Did you sleep?” 
Francisco: “Not well.” 
Paralegal: “What other fears did this cause you? What else did you stop doing?” 
Francisco: “Well, I stayed home, I didn’t eat hardly…” 
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To redact the written testimony that accompanies the asylum application, the paralegal asks 
questions to acquire details that can be used to convert Francisco’s abstract suffering into 
something that can be demonstrated “visibly” to the immigration judge. The paralegal 
investigates the consequences of traumatic events on Francisco’s health, documenting symptoms 
of mental or physical illnesses, such as lack of appetite, depression or insomnia. Like in 
Cancellation of Removal, identifying pathologies and attributing value to the suffering body 
serves to build the immigrant’s “humanitarian capital”. The paralegal also imparts concreteness 
to the abstract feeling of fear as he investigates how it impacted Francisco’s behavior, causing 
him to hide. By acquiring these tangible details, the legal intermediary quantifies suffering, 
transforming it into “humanitarian capital” to convince the judge that Francisco merits relief.  
Yet, for the purposes of quantification, not all forms of suffering yield equal amounts of 
“humanitarian capital”:  
 
John (paralegal) just prepared a young Salvadoran woman for her upcoming asylum interview. I ask 
whether he thinks she has a “strong” case. John says no, explaining, “she left her child with her 
abusive sister, who she lived with. So, you were so afraid that you left but you left your kid with an 
abusive family? She suffered abuse from them, but it was only verbal. Her sister left some bruises, but 
that’s not substantial […] then she was suicidal for two years.” The intern interrupts asking, “can she 
prove that?” John confirms, “yes, she has scars to show that,” then adds, “the only good thing is that 
she started crying.”  
 
Durable, visible or documented physical consequences are generally preferable to temporary 
or mental ones because they are easier to identify, demonstrate, and thus convert into 
“humanitarian capital.” The abuse the woman suffered at the hands of her sister constitutes a 
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lesser amount of “humanitarian capital” because it relies primarily on her credibility. Indeed, her 
claim that her sister left bruises (indicating physical abuse) is glossed over. Since these marks are 
not enduring, the abuse she suffered is reduced to “only verbal” by the paralegal. On the other 
hand, in this particular case, mental illness (i.e. suicidal behavior) constitutes a greater amount of 
“humanitarian capital,” but only because it left permanent, visible scars on her body.  
Further, according to the paralegal, her case is made “weaker” since her credibility is 
undermined because she fled while leaving her child behind. He notes that the only thing that 
helped her credibility was that she cried when telling her story; he perceives crying as a clear 
indicator of suffering, and he knows that such behavior will serve, from a performative 
standpoint, to make her vulnerability legible to the adjudicator. That day, I was taken aback by 
the paralegal’s harsh assessment of this young woman’s case. Of course, he was anticipating the 
assumptions he believed the adjudicator would make: in other words, considering the woman a 
“bad” mother for leaving her child behind, the danger she was in made lesser since she believed 
her child could stay. Yet, in doing so, he acted as agent of the law as he inadvertently reproduced 
a dehumanizing process that considers all humanitarian claimants untrustworthy.  
Indeed, because all humanitarian claimants are viewed with suspicion, the mere testimony of 
suffering is seldom enough to build “humanitarian capital”. Thus, another crucial way in which 
legal brokers quantify suffering is by demonstrating it through documents produced by 
institutions or experts. The example of a Mexican woman named Maria illustrates the centrality 
of formal proof in the legalization process. Maria witnessed a murder in the US and applied for 
the U-Visa with a private attorney but her request was denied by USCIS. She came to CLA 
because she did not understand the decision letter and her previous attorney was not responding 
to her calls. During this meeting, the CLA lawyer was trying to determine whether Maria could 
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appeal the decision: 
 
Lawyer: “Who was killed? Did you know the person?” 
Maria: “No, I was only a witness, it was the gangs.” 
The lawyer reads the USCIS letter, translating from English, “it says here, the problem is that since 
you were not yourself a victim, you have to provide evidence that you have been traumatized because 
you witnessed this crime. You have to show them how much time and what quantity you suffered.”  
The lawyer asks Maria, “Maybe you have suffered trauma and you still think about it?” 
Maria nods in agreement. 
Lawyer: “You need a certificate from a psychologist. Did you go see a psychologist when this 
happened? This paper, it counts a lot.”  
Maria: “No.” 
Lawyer: “How about a social worker?” 
Maria: “No.” 
Lawyer: “Did you speak of this with someone?” 
Maria: “Yes, the pastor.” 
Lawyer: “Good, get a letter from him. Can a family member write you a letter?”  
Maria: “Can my daughter write me a letter?” 
Lawyer: “Yes, but I prefer that she comes here so we can write a formal letter.”  
 
The attorney presents the psychologist’s certificate as the key component of an otherwise 
“weak” U-Visa application. Certifying the existence of Maria’s suffering would help her 
demonstrate her “humanitarian capital” and lend legitimacy to her application. The order in 
which the lawyer proposes professionals competent to provide this proof (first, the psychologist; 
second, the social worker) reflects the hierarchy of actors the state considers capable and 
trustworthy to certify suffering, ranked from those assumed to be most expert and neutral (i.e. 
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distant from the applicant) to those considered the least expert and neutral. Because 
psychologists (and doctors) are the highest ranked experts in the humanitarian field, the 
documentation they produce yields the most “humanitarian capital.” However, Maria did not 
interact with these professionals. She instead mobilizes her own personal, and therefore less 
neutral resources: the pastor and her daughter. In the case of the least “neutral” source, Maria’s 
daughter, the lawyer provides letter-writing services to meet demands for formality and partly 
overcome state suspicion. Yet Maria’s application remained “weak” without the superior 
“humanitarian capital” yielded by the psychologist’s certificate.  
Indeed, because humanitarian claimants rely on experts and institutions to quantify their 
suffering, barriers in access to professional help and documentary proof significantly curtail 
access to legal status. However, accessing proof is no easy matter for forced migrants who 
quickly fled their countries to save their lives. For example, Nicolas was an unaccompanied 
minor from El Salvador applying for asylum who could not prove that gang members had killed 
his brother. Although he went to the morgue to identify the corpse, it was too badly disfigured 
and he had to get a DNA test to verify the identity. However, after receiving death threats from 
the gang himself, he was forced to flee before he could get the results, and his suffering was not 
mobilized as “humanitarian capital” as effectively as it could have been because his account was 
based wholly on his credibility.  
The more asylum-seekers interacted with institutions in their home countries, the more likely 
they could provide documentary evidence to support their claims, for example police reports. 
However, several CLA clients recounted that the police refused to give them a report after they 
denounced a crime or that they feared approaching the police because they would do nothing to 
help or would reveal their identities to criminals, putting their lives at risk. Indeed, they fled their 
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home countries because of their inability to count on the state to ensure their safety, a fact that 
attorneys stress in their legal arguments, as we previously saw. It is therefore not surprising that 
asylum-seekers should have trouble producing evidence to support claims. Ironically, the 
documents produced by the very governments that fail to protect their citizens yield more 
“humanitarian capital” than the testimonies of asylum-seekers. In this way, asylum-seekers are 
made more dependent on sending states, contradicting the purported aim of asylum law.    
Similarly, to apply for the U-Visa, immigrant victims of crime must obtain a certificate from 
the US police stating that they are cooperating to ensure the prosecution of the criminal. 
However, undocumented immigrants frequently fear approaching the police and, even when they 
do, it is not uncommon for officers to deny issuing these certificates as they have discretion over 
decisions (Lakhani 2013). In these cases, CLA attorneys wrote letters and accompanied clients to 
the police but complained that even this did not always work. Without the police certification, 
the immigrant’s actual suffering cannot be mobilized as “humanitarian capital.” For example, 
Rosa had been in an abusive relationship with her ex-husband and had placed a restraining order 
against him several years earlier. However, she had never gone to the police to denounce him. 
Without the police report, she was ineligible for the U-Visa, despite having been victimized and 
having sought the help of a state court to distance her abuser. Unlike Nicolas, whose traumatic 
experience at the morgue yielded some “humanitarian capital” without documentary proof, 
despite riding solely on his testimony, Rosa’s abusive relationship could not be converted into 
“humanitarian capital” at all, due to this bureaucratic obstacle. 
Lawyers categorized immigrants who failed to demonstrate sufficient “humanitarian capital” 
and whose lived experiences failed to match codified eligibility criteria as “weak” cases. These 
immigrants usually remained undocumented and at risk of deportation. In certain cases, however, 
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they could acquire temporary protection from deportation. From January 2015 until shortly after 
Trump took office, immigration judges granted temporary protection from deportation to 
immigrants in removal proceedings who did not have “strong (enough) cases” to be awarded the 
long-term legal status (and potential path to citizenship) associated with all the forms of relief 
discussed above, yet were considered deserving of temporary status, through a type of 
prosecutorial discretion attorneys referred to as PD.   
Employing another risk management strategy, lawyers advised clients with “weak cases” to 
accept PD instead of relying on winning their humanitarian petitions for legal status. For 
example, Lourdes left Guatemala because she was being “harassed by narcotraficantes” who 
repeatedly followed her to ask about the whereabouts of her father and uncle but were never 
violent. Her attorney told her: 
 
“[Adjudicators] need to see the worst, like that you were beat up. With asylum you could get welfare and 
permanent residency, but you don’t have a strong asylum case, it’s best that you take PD, at least you will have 
a work permit.”  
 
The attorney determined that Lourdes’ suffering was “not violent enough” and thus did not 
yield sufficient “humanitarian capital” to enable her to acquire the more favorable membership 
rights (welfare and permanent residency) associated with asylee status. Therefore, the attorney 
advised that she accept the lesser benefits (temporary work/residence permit) she could obtain 
through her more limited symbolic resources instead. In the cases I observed, immigrants always 
agreed to accept PD when attorneys suggested it. However, as one attorney related, “some clients 
don’t want to accept PD because they think, ‘this thing happened to me, I’m eligible [for 
asylum],’ but it is not that simple.” This reflects how immigrants who self-identify as refugees 
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based on their experiences of forced migration and fear of returning home fail to understand why 
the receiving country’s humanitarian system fails to protect them. 
 
Conclusion 
This study demonstrates how humanitarianism operates in the nation-state, highlighting the 
contradictions that arise when the universalistic humanitarian “ethos” (Wilson & Brown 2011) is 
at odds with the inherently particularistic and exclusionary dimension of citizenship (Brubaker 
1992). To be compatible with restrictive immigration control, humanitarian immigration policies 
produce categorical distinctions within the undocumented population, creating opportunities for 
the legalization of select, and narrowly defined, subgroups. 
Using ethnographic data collected at a legal aid organization, I identify the key actors and 
mechanisms that operate in the humanitarian field, where suffering is the sole means for 
otherwise ineligible immigrants to seek membership in the nation-state. Legal intermediaries 
(attorneys, paralegals) are central actors in the field; their role involves: (1) assessing 
undocumented immigrants’ risk of deportation based on their visibility to the receiving state’s 
immigration enforcement branch; (2) determining eligibility by matching lived experience to the 
narrowly defined eligibility criteria of humanitarian policies; and (3) turning the 
incommensurable into measurable indicators by transforming immigrants’ lived experiences of 
suffering into a symbolic resource that I call “humanitarian capital.”  
By ranking and quantifying suffering legal intermediaries determine whether the immigrant’s 
case yields sufficient “humanitarian capital” to merit a certain degree of membership rights as 
determined by immigration bureaucrats in different state agencies (asylum office, immigration 
court, USCIS, state courts), which grant status on a discretionary basis and according to the logic 
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of compassion, while maintaining limited approval rates. Attorneys rely on their past experience 
to rank suffering, comparing each immigrant’s circumstances to those of successful cases. In this 
way, they anticipate likely case outcomes and mitigate the risks associated with humanitarian 
legalization, especially pathways that make undocumented immigrants more visible to the state.  
Legal intermediaries quantify suffering by identifying and attributing value to distinct 
instances of suffering in immigrants’ lives, which yield different amounts of “humanitarian 
capital.” In a context characterized by institutionalized suspicion of claimants, enduring physical 
marks more effectively demonstrate “humanitarian capital” than personal narratives of suffering, 
which depend on the immigrant’s credibility. To lend validity to personal testimonies, lawyers 
rely on professional figures. Doctors and psychologists have the greatest symbolic power in the 
humanitarian field because they have the highest expert status and are the most neutral (i.e. 
distant from the applicant) and thus “objective”; they convert pathologies or trauma into 
“humanitarian capital” through medical certificates. Others may be called upon to back claims, 
but the power they wield to consolidate “humanitarian capital” decrease with diminishing expert 
status and the closer they are to the migrant. To add further complexity, institutional figures in 
both home and host countries serve as gatekeepers, preventing immigrants from transforming 
their suffering into “humanitarian capital”. Ironically, sometimes it is their very vulnerability that 
prevents immigrants from accessing humanitarian relief; for example, asylum-seekers fail to 
satisfy evidentiary requirements precisely because they are exiled from home country institutions 
that produce documentary proof.  
Motivated by solidarity grounded in shared experience, CLA’s legal intermediaries worked 
in good faith to help their immigrant clients secure invaluable protections (legal status and a path 
to citizenship). However, their legal strategies were highly constrained by the specificities of the 
	 29 
humanitarian field, which is characterized by uncertainty and suspicion, paired with the risk 
associated with punitive immigration enforcement. Attorneys chose to work as critics of the law 
when they interpreted legal definitions broadly to apply for relief for clients who were more 
visible to the state. Attempting to prevent the deportation of those whose very lives were at risk, 
they expanded legal definitions to fit lived experiences of forced migration and victimization that 
not always closely corresponded to existing case law. Yet, when mediating access to legal status 
for undocumented immigrants living in the shadows, lawyers applied legal definitions 
conservatively to mitigate risk and protect their clients from state scrutiny and immigration 
enforcement, acting as gatekeepers and selecting only the most extreme cases of suffering most 
likely to successfully acquire relief. In doing so, they inadvertently worked as “agents of the 
law,” consolidating the victimizing process of humanitarian legalization. 
My findings underscore the restrictiveness of the US humanitarian system, as it is interpreted 
and implemented through the work of immigration attorneys. This system formally includes 
several categories that should protect immigrants with different vulnerabilities yet, in practice, 
sets thresholds of suffering so high that only the most extreme cases are deemed deserving of 
relief. As the Trump administration increasingly prioritizes enforcement over compassion, 
uncertainty and risk are becoming more salient features of the humanitarian field, further 
exacerbating the dilemma immigrants face when applying for legalization: on the one hand, this 
might enable them to acquire rights, yet at the same time it also entails becoming more visible to 
the state and, thus, at greater risk of deportation. Risk management is likely to become an even 
more important characteristic of legal strategies as attorneys advocate for immigrants 
increasingly vulnerable to punitive enforcement, and, in this new context, immigrants might be 
dissuaded from seeking relief and claiming rights. Future work can apply this theoretical 
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framework to understand how humanitarianism operates in different national contexts and assess 
how restrictive policy changes affect immigrants and legal advocacy as we witness a narrowing 
of the “humanitarian consensus” (Dauvergne 2005) worldwide.   
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